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KOEN VERMEIR*
Abstract. Traditional historiography of science has constructed secrecy in opposition to
openness. In the ﬁrst part of the paper, I will challenge this opposition. Openness and secrecy
are often interlocked, impossible to take apart, and they might even reinforce each other. They
should be understood as positive (instead of privative) categories that do not necessarily stand
in opposition to each other. In the second part of this paper, I call for a historicization of the
concepts of ‘openness’ and ‘secrecy’. Focusing on the early modern period, I brieﬂy introduce
three kinds of secrecy that are difﬁcult to analyse with a simple oppositional understanding of
openness and secrecy. In particular, I focus on secrecy in relation to esoteric traditions,
theatricality and allegory.
In 1625 at the Jesuit college in Heiligenstadt, a religious play full of allegories and
Jesuit symbolism was performed in honour of Johann Schweikhard, the visiting
Elector–Archbishop of Mainz. Much care was taken in its elaboration, and an astound-
ing display of moving scenery and ﬁreworks was arranged, giving much delight to the
spectators. In fact, the spectacle was so extraordinary that it was rumoured that black
magic was involved. After the laypeople went home, the distinguished visitors admoni-
shed the designer, demanding he explain the means he had used, and they were only
reassured after the hidden machinery behind the tricks was shown to them. These
mechanical inventions had been constructed by the young Athanasius Kircher, who was
at that time only twenty-three years old. The archbishop and his retinue were greatly
impressed by Kircher’s ingenuity and his skills won him the archbishop’s patronage,
which would be the springboard to Kircher’s brilliant career.1
This anecdote nicely illustrates the complex intertwining of the technical arts, magic,
theatricality, mixed mathematics and natural philosophy typical of baroque culture. It
also indicates the complexity and ambiguity of certain phenomena that relate to secrecy
and openness. In this episode alone, different levels of secrecy and openness can already
be found, sometimes even a mixture of both. The rest of Kircher’s career – as professor of
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1 See Kircher’s autobiography in the appendix of Hieronymus Ambrosius Langenmantel, Fasciculus
epistolarum, Augsburg, 1684, appendix, pp. 32–33.
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mathematics at the Jesuit Collegio Romano, as proliﬁc author on topics varying from
hieroglyphs and Chinese studies to the study of the earth or instrumental practices, and
as curator of a renowned museum stuffed with natural and artiﬁcial wonders –was at
least as theatrical as the stage spectacle he arranged in his youth. For the purposes of this
paper, the introductory story can serve as an exemplar of Kircher’s oeuvre, drawing
special attention to the theatricality of his work.2
In the introduction to this special issue, Dániel Margócsy and I have argued that the
traditional historiography of science constructed secrecy in opposition to openness.
Recent historiography has continued to do so.3 The current article follows naturally
from this analysis. In the ﬁrst part of the paper, I will challenge the opposition between
openness and secrecy. Much like the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity, openness
and secrecy have a shared history, even if they have sometimes been associated or
contrasted with other concepts, or if their histories brieﬂy went in different directions.
Furthermore, openness and secrecy are often interlocked, impossible to disentangle, and
may even reinforce each other.
The introduction also makes clear that much of the recent historiography has focused
on craft secrets or secrets of state. First, in this paper, I want to open up the discussion
and include a much wider array of phenomena of openness and secrecy in the history of
science. Second, although secrets and secrecy are often connected, I think it is fruitful to
distinguish them. On the one hand, there are secrets without secrecy: simple recipes,
skills or techniques that were openly available were often called ‘secrets’, for instance.
On the other hand, there exists secrecy without a secret. Because the object of secrecy is
hidden, there might not be any object at all, while all the characteristics of secrecy remain
in place.4 It is on secrecy, and not so much on secrets, that I will focus my attention in
this essay.5
On the one hand, secrecy and openness are norms or values that regulate behaviour.
Historical actors sometimes reﬂect and theorize on these norms. On the other hand,
secrecy and openness are characteristics of practices. It speaks for itself that the values of
the actors, and especially how they conceptualize them, do not necessarily map neatly on
their actual behaviour. They might express certain values as a rhetorical strategy or as a
way to justify themselves, or maybe they are not able to follow the strict norms that they
2 The theatricality of Kircher’s work has, of course, received some attention already. See especially Paula
Findlen, ‘Scientiﬁc spectacle in Baroque Rome’, Roma Moderna e Contemporanea (1995) 3, pp. 625–665;
Koen Vermeir, ‘Athanasius Kircher’s magical instruments’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2007)
38, pp. 363–400; and two contributions in a special issue of metaphorik.de by Flemming Schock et al. (eds.),
Dimensionen der Theatrum-Metapher in der Frühen Neuzeit. Ordnung und Repräsentation von Wissen,
metaphorik.de (2008) 14. For different aspects of Kircher’s work see Paula Findlen (ed.), Athanasius Kircher:
The Last Man Who Knew Everything, London: Routledge, 2004.
3 For references, see the Introduction to this issue.
4 The assumed ‘secret’ of many esoteric societies often turns out to be banal or empty when exposed.
Instead, it is the dynamics of secrecy that makes an esoteric society function. See, for example, Shaul Shaked‚
‘Two types of esotericism’, in Jan Assmann and Aleida Assmann (eds.), Schleier und Schwelle, Munich:
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1997, Band 1, pp. 221–234; see also the references in the Introduction to this special
issue.
5 On secrets of nature seeWilliam Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996. Pierre Hadot, Le voile d’Isis, Paris: Gallimard, 2004.
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impose on themselves. An actor’s use of concepts related to secrecy and openness is
especially prone to rhetorical play, because these discussions themselves are part of the
practices of openness and secrecy. Inversely, existing values may go unexpressed by the
actors; they are not necessarily made explicit –maybe they are not yet reiﬁed in a theory
or even a concept. Such values only become visible in a close study of practices. While
actors’ concepts and theories are indispensable for better understanding what is at stake
in a certain historical period, the historian of openness and secrecy should also treat
them with suspicion and restraint.
The values as well as the practices of openness and secrecy have varied strongly
throughout history.6 Up until now, the changing fortunes of secrecy have mostly been
analysed in terms of transhistorical or current analytical categories of openness
and secrecy. This has certain advantages, such as breadth of scope, but it also poses
severe limitations. In order to historicize the discussion of openness and secrecy, we
must pay close attention to actors’ categories of analysis, the distinctions and oppos-
itions they make, and we must differentiate between kinds of secrecy. In the ﬁrst part of
this paper, my aim is to open up the discursive ﬁeld in which the analytic categories of
openness and secrecy ﬁgure. This should allow us to enrich the relevant historiographical
vocabulary, to be more sensitive to lexical changes and relations between concepts
of actors and historians, as well as to include a wider array of historical practices in our
analysis.
In the second part of this paper, I will historicize the discussion further, focusing on the
early modern period. We still lack an account of how different kinds of secrecy can be
found in different practices and different periods, and how these differentiations and
transformations connect to broader cultural practices and concerns. I cannot accomplish
all this in one paper, and hence my current proposal is propaedeutic and programmatic.
I brieﬂy introduce three kinds of secrecy that are difﬁcult to analyse with a simple
oppositional understanding of openness and secrecy. The ﬁrst example is about esoteri-
cism as a long-term tradition of secrecy; the second one is about theatricality as a mode of
secrecy especially prevalent in the baroque; and the third is about allegory, which implies
a kind of secrecy that becomes particularly controversial in the seventeenth century.
Secrecy seems intrinsically paradoxical.7 The informant who is telling a secret either
directly or tacitly makes the claim that the information he speaks is not to be spoken.
Kircher also plays with such paradoxes. In the 1650s, Harpocrates, the infant god who
raises his ﬁnger to his lips, starts to appear in Kircher’s oeuvre (Figure 1).8 The tension
6 This complex interaction between the norms and practices of science, combined with their historical
variation, is the subject of the kind of historical analysis that Lorraine Daston has called ‘historical
epistemology’. See Daston’s commentary at the What (Good) Is Historical Epistemology conference, MPIWG,
Berlin, 2007. The current paper might be read as a prolegomenon to a historical epistemology of secrecy.
7 For an exposition of this theme see Beryl Bellman, ‘The paradox of secrecy’, Human Studies (1981) 4, pp.
1–24.
8 Athanasius Kircher, Oedipus Aegyptiacus, 3 vols., Rome, 1652–1655, vol. 3, p. 590, and vol. 1, p. 212.
See Nick Wilding, ‘“If you have a secret, either keep it, or reveal it”: cryptography and universal language’,
in Daniel Stolzenberg (ed.), The Great Art of Knowing, Stanford: Stanford University Libraries, 2001,
pp. 93–103. Harpocrates (or Sigalion) was well known in ancient as well as modern times as the god of silence
and secrecy; see, for a selection of references, Jean-Marc Civardi, ‘Annexe 2, Textes divers autour de l’oeuvre’,
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between secrecy and openness in Kircher’s work is captured in the image of this
‘Egyptian’ god who is enjoining silence. The image bears the enigmatic caption ‘With
this one I disclose secrets’ (Hoc uno arcane recludo). In it, the enjoining of silence is
conjoined or even identiﬁed with the disclosing of secrets; hiding and revealing are
inseparably intertwined. For current purposes, I propose to interpret the image of
Figure 1. Harpocrates, in Kircher’s Oedipus Aegyptiacus, vol. 3, p. 590. Courtesy K.U.Leuven,
Maurits Sabbebibliotheek.
Dix-septième siècle (2008) 238, pp. 118–153. For a fascinating but unexplored early modern treatise on
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Harpocrates as an emblem of the paradoxical intertwinement of secrecy and openness,
which serves as a guiding principle for this paper.
Part I: Openness and secrecy
Secrecy versus openness
Historians are usually not in the business of deﬁning concepts. This makes it sometimes
difﬁcult to know what the exact meaning is of the categories they use. In the
straightforward, traditional analyses of openness and secrecy, it is clear that they are
usually considered to be negations of each other: if something is not open, it has to be
secret, and vice versa.9 Recent historical research has studied secrecy and openness in
much more detail, resulting in a much richer and complex picture, which also implies
that the meaning of the basic terms has become more difﬁcult to ﬁx. For our purposes,
however, we are lucky that recent historiography of secrecy has drawn inspiration from
the philosopher Sissela Bok. Pamela Long has broached questions of terminology, based
on Bok’s analysis, and given explicit deﬁnitions of openness and secrecy. Karel Davids
has approvingly cited Long’s analysis, and other historians did not object to Long’s
characterization of openness and secrecy, so that her deﬁnitions can stand as a proxy
here. This gives us the advantage of having some explicit deﬁnitions to work with.10
Bok deﬁned keeping a secret from someone as ‘to block information about it or
evidence of it from reaching that person, and to do so intentionally’.11 Long adopted this
deﬁnition of secrecy as ‘intentional concealment’, and she also follows Bok in
distinguishing secrecy from privacy, ‘the condition of being protected from unwanted
access by others’, and from unknown things such as ‘secrets of nature’. Long deﬁnes
openness, in contrast with secrecy, as ‘the relative degree of freedom given to the
dissemination of information or knowledge which involves assumptions concerning the
nature and extent of the audience. It implies accessibility or lack of restrictiveness with
regard to communication’.12 Long’s deﬁnitions are subtle and qualiﬁed. She recognizes
that the notion of openness involves ‘assumptions concerning the nature and extent of
the audience’. The same qualiﬁcation should be made for secrecy. For both openness and
secrecy, it is important to specify the by whom and for whom, lest the terms be
meaningless.
When we look at speciﬁc cases, however, it is often unclear how we can apply the
general concepts of openness and secrecy, or if they are applicable at all. Is a secret kept
by a group of more than a hundred people still a secret? Should a personal conversation
9 This is a dynamic perceptible, for instance, in McMullin’s and Hull’s essays in the special issue of Science,
Technology and Human Values (1985) 10. One of the deﬁnitions in the OED characterizes secrecy as not
openly avowed or expressed. Interestingly, openness is then characterized as lack of secrecy, which is circular.
10 Karel Davids, ‘Craft secrecy in Europe in the early modern period: a comparative view’, Early Science
and Medicine (2005) 10, pp. 341–348.
11 Sissela Bok, Secrets, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, pp. 5–6.
12 Pamela Long, Openness, Secrecy, Authorship, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, pp. 7
and 5 respectively.
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between two people or a classroom discussion with ten people present be characterized
as open?13 Sometimes this is also unclear to the participants. It is well known that Isaac
Newton communicated some of his mathematical and theological ideas – orally or in
manuscript form – only to a select group of initiates, students or expert colleagues.14 It
was normal practice that Newton’s manuscripts were handed on between friends, but
Newton could also feel betrayed if some of his ideas were communicated to others
without his knowing. Although Newton sometimes explicitly warned against making his
work public (‘Pray let none of my mathematical papers be printed without my special
licence’15), the secret or public status of Newton’s manuscripts and oral pronouncements
was not always clear.16
What presuppositions about access or control are involved if we talk about openness
or secrecy? Newton had different strategies of publicizing his work, from oral com-
munication, the writing of letters, lectures at the university, and manuscript dissemin-
ation, to the formal publication of his main works.17 These types of circulation, though
not impervious, allowed Newton different kinds of control and containment, which
made different kinds of access possible for those interested in Newton’s work. This
dynamic of access and control cannot straightforwardly be classiﬁed in a dichotomy of
‘open’ or ‘secretive’. Similarly, meetings of many scientiﬁc societies, such as the Royal
Society, were accessible only to selected members. These meetings were not secretive –
often even minutes or transactions were published – but they cannot be called fully
public either. Even if an event is ‘open’ to the general public, if no one knows about it, it
might turn out to be a rather closed gathering. Similarly, Newton’s lectures on algebra
were deposited in Cambridge University Library in 1684, and in principle they became
public, but these notes were not easily accessible. Should we not say that these lectures
would have been more open, had they been more widely announced and advertised, or
even published?
With the aforementioned arguments in mind, it seems to make sense to interpret
openness and secrecy as gradational categories. Something can be open or secret to
different extents. One might think of a range of gradations between full openness and
extreme secrecy. This might also allow for a certain area between secrecy and openness,
which could be considered neutral. Many actions are directed at neither publicizing nor
hiding something, and could therefore be seen as neutral with regard to the questions of
secrecy and openness. If we compare different degrees of openness, it is of course not just
13 Bok, op. cit. (11), p. 5, takes a rather strong view in suggesting that a secret may be known to all but one
or two from whom it is kept. Should we not characterize such a secret as rather open?
14 Niccolò Guicciardini, Isaac Newton on Mathematical Certainty and Method, Cambridge MA: MIT
Press, 2009; Stephen Snobelen, ‘Isaac Newton, heretic: the strategies of a Nicodemite’, BJHS (1999) 32, pp.
381–419.
15 Isaac Newton to Henry Oldenburg, 26 October 1676, in Herbert Turnbull et al. (eds.), The
Correspondence of Isaac Newton, 7 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959–1977, vol. 2, p. 163.
16 In these cases, it becomes clear that Newton’s intention is very important for deciding whether he is
secretive or not.
17 See the analysis of Newton’s ‘scribal publication’ in Guicciardini, op. cit. (14), p. 348. For the early
modern politics of control and accessibility of information see Paul Grifﬁths, ‘Secrecy and authority in late
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century London’, Historical Journal (1997) 40, pp. 925–951.
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the number of people that are reached that has to be taken into account. Issues about
access and publicity can be more important and judgements about degrees of openness
can be very complex. The importance of these contextual factors also makes clear the
limited comparative use of the general categories of openness and secrecy, especially in
longue durée historical research. Indeed, ‘openness’ can mean something very different
in each context and time frame.
Many more questions are important for determining what kind of openness or
secrecy is at stake. What was the purpose of restricting or publicizing something?
How should we specify the kind of limited access that characterizes secrecy? There
might also be a time element involved. Someone’s last will is secret until disclosed by
the notary after the person’s death. Some kinds of authorship, intellectual property
or patents might be protected for a number of years, before being opened up to the
public.18 Newton took into account a different element of time: only when his
manuscripts started to circulate beyond his control, when his competitors came too close
to his results, or when his priority was in question, could he be persuaded to open up
some of his work.
Another view one often encounters is that openness or secrecy are privative. The
OED’s principal deﬁnitions of openness refer to ‘absence of dissimulation, secrecy, or
reserve’, and ‘lack of secrecy’. Secrecy is considered to be nothing other than the lack
of openness, in a similar way that darkness is nothing other than a lack of light.19 This
lack occurs because of some impediments, such as ﬁnancial interests, esoteric beliefs,
geographical barriers or class distinctions, without which openness would be prevalent.
In Bok’s deﬁnition, for instance, secrecy is the obstruction of the circulation of
information, i.e. of openness. It is interesting to note that in Long’s deﬁnitions we can
also ﬁnd the alternative view. Openness is characterized as a lack of restrictiveness.
Openness, for her, is not exactly the privative of secrecy (intentional restrictiveness),
but it comes close, as it is the lack of a more general restrictiveness. This means that
there can be phenomena that are neither open nor secret, such as those that arise from
a non-intentional restrictiveness (such as forgetfulness or accident).20 This also means
that her deﬁnitions do not allow for phenomena that are at the same time open and
secret.21
18 For an exploration of this matter see Biagioli’s article in this issue.
19 If secrecy is treated as a privation of openness, it is often presumed that openness is the default mode. This
is obviously different from treating openness as a privation, which presumes secrecy as the default. This
difference is reﬂected in a recent statement by ReportersWithout Borders on US Attorney General Eric Holder’s
new guidelines on the Freedom of Information Act: ‘The Bush era presumption was that information should be
kept secret and the burden was put on the person making a request for it to be revealed to prove otherwise. In
the future it should be the principles of openness and transparency that prevail.’ See http://arabia.reporters-
sans-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=30643.
20 Freud, however, would see some kinds of forgetfulness as the result of an internal censor. See Galison in
this issue for an exploration of this theme.
21 It seems that Long deﬁnes secrecy positively as intentional concealment, while openness is characterized
as a lack of restrictiveness. But, given that Long follows Bok, who interprets intentional concealment as the
intentional lack of the circulation of information, also secrecy is a privative notion. Both openness and secrecy
seem therefore to be deﬁned negatively, as the lack of something else. Luckily, openness and secrecy are not
exactly deﬁned as the lack of each other, which would be circular.
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Long’s deﬁnition is parallel to the liberal deﬁnition of freedom, which is negative or
privative, as a lack of restrictions to what one wants to do.22 There is another, positive
deﬁnition of freedom, however, as the fulﬁlment of the possibility conditions to realize
one’s potential.23 In analogy to this view, I think it is useful to consider a positive notion
of openness as well as of secrecy. Openness is not just the lack of obstacles to the
circulation of information. Discussions, writings or practices are not open just because
they take place in an accessible space. These events are neutral. To be open, their circu-
lation has to be positively promoted. They have to be publicized and the appropriate
channels have to be used. For Newton, to publish his work in a European journal might
have been relatively invisible to his English peers, and one can imagine that it might have
been interpreted by some of them as a ‘secretive’ way of establishing priority, while a
targeted manuscript circulation between the right persons might have been considered a
more open strategy.24 To create maximal openness, one needs to ﬁnd the appropriate
channels that ensure maximal reception by the relevant audience (e.g. the relevant
scientiﬁc journals).25
Many questions still remain. Does it matter for openness or secrecy how far the actual
dissemination goes? Kircher’s huge folios were disseminated all over the world, from the
Americas to China, thanks to the efﬁcient Jesuit network. But a secret society might also
be spread over the whole world. The question is, who had actual access to Kircher’s
books?26 To answer this question, we have to know who had the means to buy expensive
22 Consider an intelligent person. She would be free to develop herself intellectually in the negative sense of
freedom if no one restricts her access to education and if no one compels her to do other things. She would be
free to develop herself intellectually in the positive sense of freedom if the possibility conditions to realize her
potential are there, i.e. there are good educational institutions and she has the means to support herself while
studying.
23 See Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two concepts of liberty’, in idem, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1969. Einstein believed that academic freedom morally entailed openness: ‘By academic freedom I
understand the right to search for the truth and to publish and teach what one holds to be true. This right also
implies a duty; one must not conceal any part of what one has recognised to be true. It is evident that any
restriction of academic freedom serves to restrain the dissemination of knowledge, thereby impeding rational
judgment and action.’ This quotation attributed to Albert Einstein is inscribed on his statute in front of the
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.
24 Today, texts can be placed on the Internet, but even there they might go unread if they are not publicized
in the right way. Interestingly, even modern information overload might be a form of secrecy. This is what
agnotology – a strategy of disinformation – is about: adding large amounts of trivial, inconclusive or false data
might hamper access to the available real and important information. This was, for instance, the strategy of the
cigarette industry, when they sponsored and published enormous amounts of pseudoscience with the intention
to obliterate the real scientiﬁc ﬁndings. Here, intentions seem to be crucial in establishing whether adding
information is a form of openness or of secrecy. For agnotology see Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger
(eds.), Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
25 For a positive concept of secrecy, we need to have a proper means of hiding something and keeping the
secret. Anticipating the next section of this article, confounding openness and secrecy, we can go further and
claim that for a positive concept of secrecy, we also need channels to promote the secret so that the right people
know about it.
26 In a letter to his publisher, Kircher states that his Jesuit network distributed his books over the whole
world (including Africa and the Americas) and indicates the number of copies for the different countries.
Kircher to Joannes Jansson van Waesberghe, s.l., s.d. (draft), Archivio della Pontiﬁcia Università Gregoriana
(APUG) 561, f. 079r, ID 1428.
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folios, or who had the right social relations so he could borrow them from others. Note
that the reading and borrowing practices in place in a certain context suddenly become
crucial to assess relative openness or secrecy.27 And who could read Kircher’s
convoluted Latin? What was the rate of literacy? And for which languages? This is a
question especially pertinent for the early modern period: is a text published in the
vernacular or in Latin, and what did this imply about access and readership, about
openness and secrecy? It is known that Huygens’s and Newton’s books on optics were
published in the vernacular, probably because they thought their results did not meet
their high expectations of mathematical certainty (which they required for a publication
in Latin). A book in the vernacular would enjoy a different, more local readership. In a
certain sense, it would stay ‘closer’ to the author, part of only a relatively limited national
culture of specialists, which allows for more control by the author through a local
network. The book would also be read with a different attitude.
In another book on optics written in the vernacular, Johann Christoph Kohlhans gave
some interesting remarks on openness and secrecy in relation to language use. At the end
of many pages of detailed descriptions of optical techniques and instruments, Kohlhans
suddenly remembered a traditional injunction of secrecy from the craft traditions. He
thus objects to himself: if he discloses (offenbahren) all these things to others, ‘then these
things would become common and the art contemptible [verächtlich]’.28 His reply is
enlightening, for he simultaneously denies and afﬁrms the need for secrecy, and he
recognizes openness as a religious obligation. First, he argued that most would have no
optical ingenium and would not be able to replicate these instruments, minimizing the
actual circulation of knowledge, even if he disclosed the techniques in print. Second, he
argues that it would be unchristian and ungrateful to God not to communicate these
inventions (found because of God’s grace) to others. Third, he ﬁgures that he can
disclose exceptional inventions to a select group of people by secretive techniques. In this
case, he decides to disclose two secreta optica only to the learned by veiling them in
foreign languages, in a mixture of Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, Latin and Syrian.29 Kohlhans
therefore discloses his secrets to an elite public, to those who both are skilled in optics
and know this panoply of foreign languages. He is able to consider this as openness
(following the religious injunction to openness, to the glory of God) and as secrecy (he
follows the injunction to secrecy and does not debase his ‘optical secrets’) at the same
time.
Secrecy and openness
The most persistent view in the historiography is to treat openness and secrecy as
opposites, and most of the foregoing analysis is still consistent with such a view. There
27 Almost inaccessible publications constitute only a very limited form of openness. Intentionally restricting
access to your work (because of high expense of access) is a form of secrecy (an esoteric form of elitism). Both
can go together. Again, intentions will be crucial to distinguish limited openness from a strategy of secrecy.
28 Johann Christoph Kohlhans, Neu erfundene Mathematische und Optische Curiositäten, Leipzig:
Friederich Lankisch, 1677, pp. 317–320.
29 Kohlhans, op. cit. (28).
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are, however, instances in which openness and secrecy do not seem to exclude one
another.30 Indeed, Kohlhans seemed to think that his strategy was at the same time open
and secretive. Another example is the publication and circulation of a coded text.
Around the year 1500, Trithemius wrote the Steganographia, a book on cryptography
presented in a magical framework, which was circulated in manuscript form. When
Charles de Bovelles saw it in 1504, he immediately accused Trithemius of demonic
magic. For long, the question was whether the book’s theme was cryptography,
disguised as magic, or whether it was a book on magic, disguised as cryptography. Only
in 1606 was the Clavis, containing the key to the ciphers of Books 1 and 2, published
together with the Steganographia, thus publicly establishing the cryptographic nature of
the book. From then on the coded information could be decoded by all. For Book 3,
however, the key to the code was not revealed. This is a case in which the material text is
widely available in printed form, while the information content of the text is concealed.
To better understand the example of a published coded text, we can distinguish
between two levels of communication. There is the material circulation (manuscript or
printed text) and the circulation of information (which is restricted because of the
code).31 We have openness on the one level and secrecy on the other, because the
material text might be freely available while the code restricts access to the information
content.32 Nevertheless, a code often does not provide full secrecy and the possible
audience is open-ended, because in many cases it might be possible to crack the code.
(Furthermore, in some cases of cryptography, the code is hinted at in diverse ways and is
meant to be found by perceptive readers in a play of hiding and revealing.) Indeed, that is
what happened in the case of Book 3. Until recently, it was accepted that Trithemius’s
Book 3 was a genuine book of magic. Nevertheless, Jim Reeds was able to decipher the
coded message in 1998.33 In such a case, we do not have a determined set of people who
know the secret (the code), as in a secret society. Instead, it presents a case of an elite
form of secrecy in which only those with the necessary skills have access to the secret.34
30 There are many examples, also today. As everyone who has read detective stories knows, the best secret is
kept out in the open – it is just not recognized as relevant or as a secret. Another example in which openness and
secrecy are combined in an interesting way today is ‘product placement’. In this subtle form of advertising, a
company pays trendy people to show and use their products in public places or media. To understand this
phenomenon, it is important to see that there is an intentional attempt at showing the product as publicly as
possible, while at the same time secrecy and deception (intentional concealment of the underlying goals) are
essential to the phenomenon.
31 On the one hand, one could argue that this is an example only of a partial mix of openness and secrecy,
because the material and information levels can be conceptually distinguished. On the other hand, if it is true
that the message and the material bearer can never be fully separated conceptually, this is also a real mixture of
openness and secrecy.
32 Imagine, however, that the coded book was printed and publicly available, while the code was distributed
separately to a limited number of recipients. In this case, one can say that the information is kept secret within a
small group, even if the book and the material circulation of the text would be considered public. This situation
also compares to the Kohlhans case, in which he tries to encode his message by using foreign languages that are
difﬁcult to access.
33 Jim Reeds, ‘Solved: the ciphers in Book III of Trithemius’s Steganographia’, Cryptologia (1998) 22, pp.
291–317.
34 It was a standard remark in esoteric traditions that only the worthy would ﬁnd out the secrets carefully
veiled in esoteric texts. Difﬁcult mathematical challenges are another example of elite secrecy. It was common
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The secret is intentionally concealed, but it is knowable for those smart enough to ﬁgure
it out. Secrecy is often not watertight, and can therefore become a challenge.
Newton’s publication strategy is another example of how openness and secrecy, as
positive categories, can be combined. Newton did not close himself in an ivory tower but
used ‘scribal publication’, as Niccolò Guicciardini explains.35 He intentionally
disseminated his ideas by means of private conversation, letters and manuscripts.
Simultaneously, by this strategy, Newton also attempted to control the dissemination of
his work with the intention to restrict access for competing mathematicians such as
Leibniz. Scribal publication allowed Newton intentionally to spread his ideas and to
restrict the circulation of those ideas, effectively combining openness and secrecy. Many
practices involve this double intentionality, of dissemination and restriction, often
directing each aspect at different groups of people.
Maybe the best example that shows that openness and secrecy are not necessarily
oppositional is the notion of the ‘public secret’ or the ‘open secret’. An open secret is that
which is generally known, but is not or cannot be recognized publicly, for a diversity of
possible reasons. A public secret is often intentionally concealed, is not explicitly
conﬁrmed in public, and is sometimes explicitly denied; yet it can be actively
communicated and publicized along all kinds of channels. An excellent example is
again Newton, who was widely known for his heretical beliefs. Although Newton
restricted his theological exchanges to a very select circle, by 1710, as Stephen Snobelen
has shown, word had got out and it had become an open secret. Newton never publicly
recognized being a heretic, but his strategies of avoiding a direct confrontation inevitably
fed the rumour mill.36 Typically, public secrets are not publicly recognized because of
moral impropriety, or fear of persecution or retaliation, and to create mystery, to keep a
surprise or to play with the dynamics of secrecy.37 Interestingly, a public secret can be
very open and secret at the same time: it can be intentionally concealed and generally
in the early modern period to publicize only a mathematical problem, while the solution was carefully guarded
by the challenger. Only the best practitioners were able to discover the secret or ‘crack the code’. This shared
ability to reach the same secret often constituted tight social ties – of friendship or of rivalry. In natural
philosophy, we ﬁnd a similar dynamic at work: nature was conceived of as a book, written in a code that only
the elite would be able to break. The idea of mathematics and natural philosophy as elite practices that allowed
access to ‘secrets’ was common but controversial in the early modern period. Boyle, amongst others, strongly
condemned this kind of elitist secrecy. Leibniz, for his part, wrote about the arcana rerum, the secret of things,
when discussing the obscure relation between mind and body, stating that this secret could only be penetrated
by a few, the most thorough thinkers.
35 See note 17 above. See also Harold Love, Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993.
36 Snobelen, op. cit. (14), pp. 412–415. Also Newton’s authorship of the optics and some mathematical
works, which did not mention his name and were published by his disciples, can be considered an open secret.
Quite often, the authorship of anonymous publications was quickly found out, but the fact that their name did
not ﬁgure on the title page could offer legal and social protection.
37 Examples today may be the liaison of a famous politician, a scandal someone in the company is involved
in, the sexual orientation of a public ﬁgure, religious views in a context of persecution, that the police force is
involved in the drugs trade, or the identity of Santa Claus for children.
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known and discussed.38 These examples suggest that openness and secrecy are not
necessarily opposites and can go together in a positive way.39
A provisional conclusion: both openness and secrecy are the results of intentional
attitudes and practices (intentional concealment or dissemination), and in order to be
realized they have to be actively pursued. They are neither each other’s negation nor
privation. Within the sphere of openness and secrecy, there exist different gradations, as
something can be more or less publicized or hidden respectively. In fact, many practices
are ‘neutral’ with respect to openness and secrecy, as they are not speciﬁcally directed at
publicizing or concealing. We can ﬁnd some examples of this in close historical analyses,
but the opposition between openness and secrecy has not been questioned. Neither have
such cases been taken up by the historiographical discourse on openness and secrecy.
Recognizing the problematic nature of the opposition between openness and secrecy
helps us to open up a discursive ﬁeld with alternative historiographical categories, to
make us more sensitive to a diversity of related actors’ categories, and to open up more
phenomena as relevant for discussions of scientiﬁc openness and secrecy.
Part II: Three kinds of early modern secrecy
Kinds of secrecy
The concepts ‘openness’ and ‘secrecy’ do not have a clear counterpart in different
languages, and also the way openness and secrecy are contrasted depends on linguistic,
historical and contextual factors.40 As I have shown above, the analytical opposition
between openness and secrecy is unstable and, in practice, there exist cases in which
openness and secrecy merge or become indistinguishable. Sometimes, whether a practice
is considered open or secretive depends on the perspective of the actors or the
historian.41 Therefore it is important not to reduce practices to ‘open’ or ‘secretive’, but
to look at broader semantic ﬁelds and wider cultural developments relating to dynamic
forms of openness and secrecy. This also means that it becomes virtually impossible to
compare ‘openness’ and ‘secrecy’ as such throughout the ages. These categories should
be historicized: they acquire a different character and a different meaning in other times
and contexts, and their mutual relation changes.
38 Its aspect of being a ‘secret’ only disappears when the fact is publicly recognized by those implicated (or
when the fact itself disappears). For instance, a liaison between a famous politician and an actress stops being a
public secret if they publicly recognize this relationship.
39 An interesting case today is Wikileaks, where, although the secrets are out, government employees are not
allowed to refer to them.
40 In French, for instance, ‘secrecy’ relates to a whole lexical ﬁeld, such as discrétion, silence, cacher,
dissimulation, receler, voiler andmasquer, and ‘openness’ corresponds best to faire public. In German, ‘secrecy’
comes close to Geheimhaltung and ‘openness’ to Öffentlichkeit, although Öffentlichkeit has more a
connotation of public opinion or the public sphere.
41 Newton might think he is publicizing his mathematical results while his competitors still accuse him of
secrecy, for instance, because in his publications he still kept certain techniques hidden. This is even clearer in
the case of his religious beliefs: while Newton thought he followed the religious injunction not to ‘hide one’s
light under a bushel’, William Whiston is shocked that Newton does not more freely declare his faith.
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Early modern secrecy is located between changing earlier and later cultural practices
of secrecy. In the Middle Ages, a certain amount of prudence, discretion and
dissimulation seems to have been the norm.42 Certain events, such as the institution of
a regular obligatory confession in 1215, or the adoption of the printing press in the
1440s, are seen as key moments that radically changed existing attitudes and practices.43
In contrast, the modern structures of openness, theÖffentlichkeit of Enlightenment civic
society, were very different. This restructuring of openness also had consequences for
new and different relations with changing forms of secrecy in the sciences, speciﬁcally
with respect to early modern or ‘baroque’ forms of secrecy. Jon Snyder has characterized
this period as a culture of dissimulation.44 William Eamon has studied the metaphor of
the venatio for the discovery of nature’s secrets,45 and also the Neoplatonic metaphor of
the veil was commonplace in the seventeenth century.46 As Kircher put it, the veil
represents the secretive workings of nature.47 Studying such metaphors can help us to
understand the ﬁne structure of secrecy of a certain period. Here I would like to elaborate
on the episode I presented in the introduction to this essay, and focus on three modes of
secrecy that are manifest in Kircher’s work.
To make the spectacle for the elector–archbishop effective, Kircher hid the machinery
and the philosophical principles behind the special effects, and the public was taken
in. When Kircher unveiled his devices for an elite audience after the play, behind the
scenes a new show in another kind of theatre was performed. Kircher unveiled exactly
how these machines caused the wonderful effects displayed on the stage, without any
need for demonic invocations. On similar occasions, Kircher would also explain their
workings at a deeper philosophical level. Skilled artiﬁcers were much in demand, but it is
clear from the example that Kircher only unveiled his devices to an elite, at a moment
when he could have been accused of witchcraft, or when social opportunities were
involved. Howwe evaluate his attitude as regards openness depends on the scientiﬁc and
religious stakes involved, on the social context and on our analytic perspective as
historians.
Kircher’s attitudes towards openness and secrecy remained ambiguous throughout his
career. His museum was relatively open to visitors, provided they had standing and the
right recommendations; his scholarly network had a worldwide scope, but he also had to
deal with censorship and with a controversial reputation. Sometimes Kircher refused to
give more information; at other times he rushed into print with inventions made by
42 Assmann and Assmann, op. cit. (4), p. 13. Note also that Petrarch called his book on spiritual exercises
‘the secret’.
43 Michael Giesecke, ‘Den “brauch gemein machen”. Die typographische Erfassung der Unfreien Künste’,
in Assmann and Assmann, op. cit. (4), p. 291–311. Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of
Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Eamon, op. cit. (5), Chapter 3.
44 Jon Snyder, Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2009.
45 Eamon, op. cit. (5), Chapter 8.
46 Aleida Assmann, ‘Der Dichtung Schleier aus der Hand der Wahrheit. Esoterische Dichtungstheorien in
der Neuzeit’, in Assmann and Assmann, op. cit. (4), pp. 263–280. Hadot, op. cit. (5).
47 Kircher, op. cit. (8), vol. 1, p. 191.
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others. Kircher was very well versed in esoteric traditions, but, as we can see from the
introductory episode, he mastered the play of hiding and revealing in a broader sense
too. This theatricality would remain present in all his later work, heightened by
symbolical plays, allusive meanings and allegorical illusionism.
In the following, I want to focus on esoteric traditions, the theatricality of secrecy and
the secretive aspect of allegory and symbolism. These cases represent three attempts to
characterize complex forms of secrecy in different ways. First, esoteric traditions present
a diachronic approach to secrecy, focusing on the long-term existence of speciﬁc
traditions. These traditions codify speciﬁc norms of secrecy. Second, theatrical secrecy is
a way to think about synchronic secrecy: in this case, a kind of secrecy that is particularly
apt to characterize secretive practice in baroque culture. Allegorical secrecy is a practice
that was under attack in the seventeenth century, and can be studied as an important
phase in changing attitudes towards secrecy. Each of these three forms of secrecy had a
particular signiﬁcance in the baroque period.48
Esoteric traditions
The idea that early modern esoteric traditions were characterized by secrecy, in contrast
to science, which was essentially open, has been challenged by revisionist historians in
the last two decades.49 On the one hand, both alchemists and early chemists (or
chymists) dabbled in secrecy, and clear distinctions between them cannot be drawn.50
Practices of famous natural philosophers were also characterized by exchanges of
secrets, in order to protect state interests, to respect artisans’ demands for secrecy, or to
try to secure priority. Alchemists, natural magicians, artisans and natural philosophers
all seemed to meddle in many forms of secrecy.51
On the other hand, authors from esoteric traditions sometimes strived for openness.
Agrippa Von Nettesheim actively strived for an open discussion, for instance. He
defended the authorship of his works and tried to publish widely. In contrast, he also
urged secrecy and argued that magic would be destroyed by publicity. He claimed that
he himself had used several strategies of concealment in his books and that he withheld
48 These are all types of secrecy that are more general and can be found in different periods. The
theatricality of secrecy, in a different mode, can also be perceived in present-day scientiﬁc practice, for instance.
Every scientiﬁc expression is characterized by some kind of hiding and revealing, is set in a certain mode of
(‘theatrical’) presentation and uses symbolical representations, and can be analysed with appropriate
historiographical tools. For an example see Hilgartner’s article in this issue.
49 For the classical view see Brian Vickers (ed.), Occult and Scientiﬁc Mentalities in the Renaissance,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; William Eamon, ‘From the secrets of Nature to public
knowledge’, Minerva (1985) 23, pp. 321–347; Betty Dobbs, ‘From the secrecy of alchemy to the openness of
chemistry’, in Tore Frängsmyr (ed.), Solomon’s House Revisited, Canton: Science History Publications, 1990,
pp. 75–94; Paul David, ‘The historical origins of “open science”’, Capitalism and Society (2008) 3(2), article 5.
50 William Newman, ‘Alchemical symbolism and concealment’, in Peter Galison and Emily Thompson
(eds.), The Architecture of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 59–77.
51 Jan Golinski, ‘Chemistry in the Scientiﬁc Revolution,’ in David Lindberg and Robert Westman (eds.),
Reappraisals of the Scientiﬁc Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 367–396; Larry
Principe, ‘Robert Boyle’s alchemical secrecy’, Ambix (1992) 39, pp. 63–74.
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the key needed to interpret his work.52 It was necessary to be personally guided by the
master in order to understand his work.
We could conclude from such analyses that both sciences and esoteric traditions are
characterized by a mixture of openness and secrecy. As Pamela Long writes, ‘these
sources demonstrate an intricate mixture of openness and secrecy, exoteric and esoteric
orientations. Open dissemination and articulation of the value of openness exist side by
side with secrecy and the defence of esoteric knowledge’.53 However, the same
conclusion can be drawn for many practices if they are scrutinized in detail.
Concretely, in this case, the problem is that we cannot use secrecy or openness any
more to draw useful distinctions between the sciences and esoteric traditions. Of course,
some sciences might be esoteric; that is not the point. The problem is to ﬁnd a
characterization of esoteric traditions that does not simply refer to ‘secrecy’ – because the
sciences and many other non-esoteric practices are also secretive.
One way of characterizing esoteric traditions is to take their nature as ‘traditions’
seriously.54 Indeed, in esoteric traditions one can ﬁnd a similar inveighing against
openness repeated over and over again. Sometimes, it was speciﬁed that publicizing
secrets would debase them by their exposure to the vulgar multitude;55 at other times,
simple admonitions for concealment, vows of secrecy or warnings for betrayers are
expressed. Interestingly, these are like ﬁxed formulas, endlessly repeated in different
books and contexts, which suggests that their function is ritual and rhetorical, and
independent of the content they supposedly protect. ‘Do not cast pearls for the swine’ is a
traditional injunction to esoteric behaviour. Such formulas can serve as markers that
allow us to recognize an esoteric tradition or lineage.
The maxim marked on the entrance of Plato’s Academy, ‘Let no one ignorant of
geometry enter here’, repeated in many sixteenth-century books (including the title page
of Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus), represents another kind of secrecy: an elitism
reminiscent of esoteric initiation practices.56 Certain traditional formulas can also be
52 Agrippa Von Nettesheim, ‘Letter to Aurelio Acquapendente, September 1527’, in idem, Opera, vol. 2,
Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1970, pp. 874–875.
53 Long, op. cit. (12), p. 144; see also pp. 174 and 246.
54 Esoteric (versus exoteric) traditions are not the same as ‘esotericism’. As a concept for a current of
thought, ‘esotericism’was only introduced in the nineteenth century, and is not applicable for the early modern
period.
55 This was not an idle worry. In fact, this debasement seems to have actually occurred with the wonders
presented at the Royal Society, leading to a coup by the mathematically minded natural philosophers. See
Steven Shapin, ‘Robert Boyle and mathematics: reality, representation, and experimental practice’, Science in
Context (1988) 2, pp. 23–58; Moti Feingold, ‘Mathematicians and naturalists: Sir Isaac Newton and the Royal
Society’, in Jed Buchwald and I. B. Cohen (eds.), Isaac Newton’s Natural Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2001, pp. 77–102.
56 Note furthermore that early modern mathematicians believed that ancient mathematicians followed
esoteric methods and practices. Descartes wrote, ‘Nous remarquons assez que les anciens géomètres ont fait
usage d’une sorte d’analyse qu’ils étendaient à la résolution de tous les problèmes, bien qu’ils l’aient
jalousement cachée à leur postérité.’ René Descartes, Regulae, IV, in Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam
and Paul Tannery, 12 vols., Paris: Cerf, 1897–1910, vol. 10, p. 375. Early modern mathematicians often
followed this tradition. The technical nature of mathematics was a way to deﬁne and guard the boundaries of a
discipline, not completely unlike the boundary work of a secret society.
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reinterpreted and appropriated in a different context. The biblical phrases ‘I have yet
many things to say unto you, but you cannot bear them now’, (John 16:12) and ‘I have
given you milk to drink, and not meat to eat: for hitherto you were not able’ (1
Corinthians 3:1–2), are interpreted by Augustine to argue against esoteric traditions but
used by Newton for justifying his esoteric behaviour.57
In many cases, the content of the secret is not the most important aspect; instead, the
rhetorical and social dynamics are central. As a genre, esoteric formulas create a certain
identity and tradition, which is increased by the speciﬁc dynamics of secrecy, all about
inclusion and exclusion. Esoteric practices are often characterized by speciﬁc social
institutions, such as secret societies and initiation rituals. The ‘do not divulge it’ label
implies a speciﬁc rhetoric that plays with the psychodynamic and social characteristics of
secrecy that we described in the Introduction to this special issue, and the circulation of
conﬁdential information shapes and differentiates speciﬁc social relationships between
artisans, adepts, virtuosi and natural philosophers.58
William Eamon expresses his wonder at the fact that early modern ‘Europe had been
inundated with scores of treatises that professed to reveal the “secrets of nature” to
anyone who could read’.59 To understand such phenomena, it is important not to be
misled by the actors’ categories and not to take the rhetoric of secrecy at face value.
There is nothing paradoxical, per se, in the dissemination of secrecy or the values of
secrecy, and many of the secrets transmitted in the books of secrets were ‘open secrets’
that were already widely known and applied. Finally, as in Kircher’s emblem of
Harpocrates, in saying that one keeps a secret one may actually communicate that one
wants to unveil it. Cunning use of the rhetoric of secrecy was a powerful means of
building a reputation, by advertising that one has a secret as widely as possible and at the
same time carefully controlling access to the content of the secret. This was how many
secrets were exchanged between clients and patrons, how the ﬁrst ‘academies of secrets’
functioned, and how alchemists as well as natural philosophers vied for the patronage of
powerful princes.
A study of esoteric traditions most clearly shows the limits of the traditional
conceptual apparatus. If we do not think of openness and secrecy as opposites, however,
but as positive states that can coexist, new possibilities to describe esoteric traditions
open up. A secret is only worth something if someone knows you have a secret, and
esoteric traditions play with the dialectic of lure and withdrawal in advertising their
secrets. Esoteric writing constitutes a speciﬁc genre with similar formulaic and stylistic
characteristics. The skilful use of obscurity and mystiﬁcation, blending obliqueness and
opacity – combined forms of secrecy and openness – is also central. Esoteric traditions
57 See also Hebrews 5:12–14. Augustine, Confessions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, Chapter 18.
idem, Tractates on the Gospel of John (tr. John Rettig), Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1994, Tractate 98. For a
discussion of Augustine see Guy Stroumsa, Hidden Wisdom: Esoteric Traditions and the Roots of Christian
Mysticism, Leiden: Brill, 2005, esp. Chapter 8. For Newton see Snobelen, op. cit. (14).
58 In some cases, secret societies develop with their own speciﬁc dynamics built around secrecy. See Georg
Simmel, ‘The sociology of secrecy and of secret societies’, American Journal of Sociology (1906) 11, pp. 441–
498.
59 Eamon, op. cit. (5), p. 3.
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are therefore better described as a play of veiling and unveiling, a simultaneous partial
revelation and partial concealment, and close attention to the rhetorical, psychological
and social aspects of this dynamic needs to be paid.
Theatrical forms of communication
Kircher’s youthful elaboration of a stage play, as well as the later theatricality of his
technical, mathematical and philosophical contributions, show that he was a born
dramaturge, an aptitude that never left him. The theatricality of his displays of natural
and artiﬁcial wonders at the Collegio Romano, his performance of tests and
demonstrations, the sumptuous presentation of his oeuvre, can be interpreted in many
ways. On the one hand, these practices could be characterized as instances of open
‘scientiﬁc’ demonstration, in which mathematical operations and philosophical results
are communicated to the public, similar to the lectures and demonstrations of Renaudot,
Rohault and later ’sGravesande. On the other hand, Kircher’s staging of wonderful
effects could be compared to a stage magician or to the professors of secrets, who were
steeped in a so-called ‘culture of secrecy’.
These opposite characterizations indicate again the spuriousness of the opposition
between ‘open science’ and ‘secretive magic’. At the same time, such theatrical events
show that a strict distinction between ‘openness’ and ‘secrecy’ is impossible to uphold.
Indeed, the ‘theatrical’ at the same time both refers to a public event and includes
practices of concealment, illusion and deception. To what extent natural philosophy
could be theatrical was a central question at the time. Jan Golinski has shown the
tensions within the Royal Society, between the Baconian ideal of openness and the
practical need for secrecy. The Royal Society could not become too open, some argued,
because it might be perceived as mere theatre and entertainment.60 At the same time,
however, the world became progressively more conceptualized as a theatre. In the words
of Richard Alewyn and Karl Sälzle: ‘Every epoch creates its image through which it gives
its answer to the question of the meaning of life and in which it delivers the key to its
secret. The answer of the Baroque is: The world is a theatre.’61
The baroque was a theatrical time. The development of techniques of the self, allowing
one to hide one’s secrets and to read the secrets of others, had been perfected since the
Middle Ages. In a courtly culture of simulation and dissimulation, of pleasing and
seducing patrons and opponents, these techniques were necessary to survive in a charged
social setting.62 Courtiers learned how to form and present their ‘self’ to the outside
world.63 Religious intolerance forced even celebrated philosophers such as Newton to
60 Jan Golinski, ‘A noble spectacle: phosphorus and the public cultures of science in the early Royal
Society’, Isis (1989) 80, pp. 11–39.
61 Richard Alewyn and Karl Sälzle, Das grosse Welttheater, Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1959, p. 48, translation
mine.
62 Jon Snyder, op. cit. (44), has argued that, from the sixteenth century, dissimulation (as distinct from
simulation) became a virtue in an absolutist society.
63 See, for example, Joann Cavallo, ‘Joking matters: politics and dissimulation in Castiglione’s Book of the
Courtier’, Renaissance Quarterly (2000) 53, pp. 402–424; Mark Franko elaborates a concept he describes as
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develop elaborate strategies to dissimulate their beliefs.64 The techniques of Nicodemism
and Jesuit Casuistry ﬂourished even as they were attacked by polemicists such as Calvin
and Pascal.65 The triumph of Sigalion, the god of secrecy, was celebrated in Jesuit ballets
(and critics remarked that the Jesuits worshipped him as an idol).66 Everyone was
wearing a mask, and as Shakespeare, Calderón, Molière and many other authors
remarked, we all play our different roles on the stage of the world. The dynamics of
baroque openness and secrecy, of hiding and revealing, have to be understood in these
theatrical terms.
Not only the world and the self, but also knowledge became understood in terms of
performance. Secretum had been replaced by theatrum. The medieval secreta mulierum,
the literature on women’s matters, for instance, had now become a theatrum
mulierum.67 If we only look at the book titles published in the late sixteenth and the
seventeenth centuries, we ﬁnd Theatrum anatomicum, Theatrum naturae, Theatrum
animalium, Theatrum botanicum, Theatrum chimicum, Theatrum machinarum,
Theatrum orbis terrarum, even a Theatrum sympatheticum auctum, and many more.
The theatre metaphor came to stand for the orderliness, the unlocking and accumulation
of knowledge. It promulgated the openness of knowledge, which was staged as a festive
spectacle and promised a complete synoptic access to the world. At the same time,
however, the theatre metaphor could be used for stressing the illusionary nature of
appearances, or the veiled nature of knowledge, which never arrived at the true
substance of things. The theatre metaphor referred to the complex dynamic and the
interlocking of openness and secrecy involved in knowledge and knowledge practices.68
Inversely, the psychodynamics of secrecy are also crucial for understanding
performativity and theatrical phenomena. To captivate the public, one should not
disclose too much at a time. In order to incite the imagination and to give the public a
‘opaque self-transparency’ in his analysis of the performance of ‘self’ in relation to social and political power
encoded in the practices of the French baroque ballet de cour, in Dance as Text: Ideologies of the Baroque
Body, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
64 See note 14 above.
65 Perez Zagorin, Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. The last chapters on occultism and libertinism would be the
most interesting for our current purposes, if Zagorin had not reduced very different kinds of secrecy to
‘dissimulation’. See also Fernand Hallyn, Descartes: Dissimulation et ironie, Genève: Droz, 2006, for
dissimulation in the works of Descartes.
66 Pascal Colasse, ‘Ballet de Sigalion Dieu du secret, dansé aux Jésuites l’an 1689’, in Philidor Laisné (ed.),
Les Ballets Des Iesuistes Composé par Messieurs Beauchant, Desmatins et Collasse, s.l., 1690, pp. 167–189.
For the critical review, also attacking the probabilism of the Jesuits, see Les Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques (BnF, Ms.
fr. 23499, ff. 294–295), reprinted, with another contemporary description of the ballet, in Civardi, op. cit. (8).
67 This transformation is, of course, not linear and needs to be studied in detail. The – often
misogynous – discussion of women’s affairs by male medical writers and philosophers seems to have changed
from a focus on recipes and knowledge about generation in the Secretis Mulierum tradition into a broader
discussion of women’s outward appearances and national dresses (e.g. Jost Amman,Gynaeceum, sive theatrum
mulierum, 1586) and (often satiric) misogynistic comments about ‘evil women’ and the recipes and tricks they
use (s.n., Theatrum Malorum Mulierum, ca. 1700). About women’s secrets see Katharine Park, Secrets of
Women, New York: Zone Books, 2006; Monica Green, ‘Secrets of women’, Journal of Medieval and Early
Modern Studies (2000) 30, pp. 5–40.
68 See the essays in Schock et al., op. cit. (2).
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sense of wonder, hidden things should be gradually unveiled, building up the tension and
slowly increasing the fascination. This play between veiling and unveiling was an
important aspect of natural and artiﬁcial magic, but it was also part of demonstrations in
experimental philosophy. The apparent ambiguities in openness and secrecy are actually
constitutive of Kircher’s approach. Depending on the public, Kircher meticulously veiled
or explained the causes behind his wondrous demonstrations. Different kinds of wonder
and theatricality were appropriate and could help in attracting patronage. The beholders
could be delighted or thrilled by the optical or mechanical illusions, or they reacted with
anxiety if they feared demonic involvement. In a very different kind of theatre,
uncovering the hidden techniques and natural principles aroused the interest and
admiration of the précieux. Sometimes, however, Kircher even misled the most
prominent of spectators . . .69
The practices of secrecy in early modern mathematics were theatrical too. François
Viète made a habit of dissimulation in his work, while Roberval pretended to have the
solutions of many mathematical problems, but refused to show them.70 Others
published brilliant but only partial solutions to a problem, leaving the readers in the
dark about the full proof. Secrecy and the appropriation of results in mathematical
practice sometimes even led to a comedy of errors: Beaugrand suggested to Galileo that
he had found solutions that in fact came from Mersenne and Roberval. When Torricelli
found these papers in Galileo’s estate, he published them under his own name, although
in France everyone knew the real authors.71 Such an analysis of ‘the theatrical’ should
be extended to texts and their readers, as Dominique Descotes has done. He described
the presentation of mathematical results – the way Pascal tried to convince his readers,
the disposition of his material, the hiding and revealing of partial results and the
suspension of a key technique in his mathematical texts – as conforming to the
composition of Corneille’s theatrical plays.72
There is often a remarkable contrast between what authors write and what they do. If
they really wanted to keep their solutions or doctrines secret, why publish? Why stir up
controversies? Why admit to having secrets? Openly indulging in secrecy is like a
theatrical performance. The rhetoric of secrecy communicates not facts but certain
expectations, attitudes and feelings – it creates a fascination, a certain thrill – and invites
certain behaviour. Augustine already knew the trappings of secrecy: ‘By such secrecy
profane teachers give a kind of seasoning to their poisons for the curious, that thereby
they may imagine that they learn something great, because counted worthy of holding a
secret.’73 As Georg Simmel has shown, secrecy also promotes the social cohesion of the
69 Kircher sometimes exposed tricks, but he defrauded too, for speciﬁc and very diverse local and contextual
reasons. See, for example, the interesting account in Thomas Hankins and Robert Silverman, Instruments and
the Imagination, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995.
70 Roberval’s colleague, René-François de Sluse, complained that this cast a suspicion of plagiarism on
anyone who came up with a solution to a problem, because a competitor who had not openly disclosed his
results might always claim priority.
71 Dominique Descotes, Blaise Pascal: Littérature et géométrie, Clermont-Ferrand: Presses universitaires
Blaise Pascal, 2001, pp. 27–33.
72 Descotes, op. cit. (71). pp. 85, 111.
73 Augustine cited in Stroumsa, op. cit. (57), p. 143.
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initiates, inviting a master–adept structure and granting a speciﬁc kind of prestige to the
sage. Leibniz accused Descartes of wanting to found a sect by his strategies of secrecy
and dissimulation,74 even suggesting that Descartes had learned this from the Jesuits.75
In some cases, the rhetoric of secrecy and the theatre’s dialectic of veiling and unveiling
also literally coincided. To sell their secrets, mountebanks climbed the stage to sing their
praises, and Eamon argues that this is the cradle of the commedia dell’arte. Della Porta’s
natural magic resembled in certain respects the stage plays he conducted.76 A different
mode of theatricality went on in Kircher’s museum at the Collegio Romano. Like
esotericism, theatricality serves well as a test case for the traditional openness/secrecy
distinction. Kircher’s example is not meant to be representative for all scientiﬁc practices,
but it has a broader relevance. It crystallizes important aspects that show the necessity of
invoking concepts at the crossroads of openness and secrecy. If openness and secrecy are
seen as positive states that are actively pursued simultaneously, it becomes clear that they
can even reinforce each other in a theatrical play of hiding and revealing. The
historiographical study of ‘theatricality’ particularly suits the baroque period, but can
also be applied to other contexts and periods. Of course, the dramaturgies of the
commedia dell’arte, a charlatan advertising his recipes, a Corneille play, a mathematical
proof, a Jesuit religious theatre or someone playing the buffoon are all very different.
Therefore different modes of theatricality and secrecy should be distinguished and
further studied in their historical and contextualized instantiations.77
Allegory: symbolism, illusion, allusion and the constitution of meaning
Avancini’s Pietas Victrix, a 1659 Jesuit theatre play, re-enacted the 312 AD battle for
Rome between the tyrant Maxentius and Emperor Constantinus, invoking magi,
dragons, demons, ghosts and an apparition of the Virgin Mary in the clouds. The magus
summoned a dragon for Maxentius, but it was defeated by the Habsburg eagle, which
stood as a symbol for piety. The moral is clear, and the Habsburg eagle symbolically
transposed the scene into the 1659 reality of the Counter-Reformation. Jesuit theatre
and Jesuit practices of natural and technical enquiry were infused with marvellous
techniques as well as with allegories and symbols referring to deeper religious truths.
Kircher’s machinery in his 1625 theatre play displayed similar themes, and even his
74 ‘L’Esprit de secte et l’ambition de celuy qui pretend de s’ériger en chef de parti fait grand tort à la verité et
aux progrès des sciences. Un auteur qui a cette vanité en teste tache de rendre les autres meprisables, il cherche à
faire paroistre leur defauts; il supprime ce qu’ils ont dit de bon et tache de se l’attribuer sous un habit deguisé’.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, in C.I. Gerhardt (ed.), Die philosophischen Schriften, 7 vols., Berlin:
Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1875–1890, vol. 4, p. 304. For more on Descartes’s practices of secrecy see
Michel Serfati and Dominique Descotes (eds.), Mathématiciens français du XVIIe siècle, Clermont-Ferrand:
Presses universitaires Blaise Pascal, 2008, p. 18; and Hallyn, op. cit. (65).
75 Leibniz, op. cit. (74), p. 320.
76 Eamon, op. cit. (5), Chapter 7 and p. 227; David Gentilcore, Medical Charlatanism in Early Modern
Italy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
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mathematical and philosophical oeuvre hid diverse political, moral, religious and
philosophical layers of meaning.78
Secrecy and symbolism went together in many ways in the early modern period.
Cryptography, extensively studied in the seventeenth century, aimed at a rather
straightforward coding and decoding of content, although it was embedded in a
complex culture of secrecy. Kircher imagined that he could decipher the allegorical
language of ancient Egypt, concealed in the hieroglyphs. Alchemy, with its complex
methods of symbolism, Decknamen and concealment, was seen as the epitome of a
secretive science. Although Elias Ashmole saw the ‘hieroglyphic’ character of alchemy as
a sign of wisdom, hiding its secrets in ‘Vailes and Shadows, as in other parts of the
Mistery’, Francis Bacon argued that professors of these practices veiled their errors ‘by
enigmatical writings . . . and such other devices to save the credit of impostures’.79
From the mid-sixteenth century, allegorical interpretations of myths became very
popular, and interpreters looked for physical, moral, political and sometimes theological
meanings. In hisMythologia (1581), Natale Conti describes the ‘covered dissemination’
that characterized allegorical myth: the ancients ‘did not disseminate philosophical
doctrine openly [apertè], but in obscure [obscurè] terms behind certain coverings
[integumentis]’.80 Francis Bacon, whose mythographical practice was based on Conti,
also pointed out the conﬂuence of openness and secrecy in allegory.81 Allegory, Bacon
wrote, ‘is of double use [ambigui] and serves for contrary purposes; for it serves for an
infoldment [involucrum]; and it likewise serves for illustration [illustrationem]. In the
latter case the object is a certain method of teaching, in the former an artiﬁce for
concealment [occultandi artiﬁcium]’.82 Allegory disseminates and conceals at the same
time. The ancients used allegory to teach their philosophy, something Bacon explored in
his De Sapientia Veterum (1609), but at the same time allegory was about things ‘the
dignity whereof requires that they should be seen as it were through a veil [velo]; that is
when the secrets and mysteries [occulta et mysteria] of religion, policy, and philosophy
are involved in fables or parables’.83
Physical interpretations of myth and the role of allegory and symbolism in
natural philosophy were hotly contested in the seventeenth century. Although Bacon
discovered his own natural philosophy in the ancient myths, he scolded the alchemists,
who ‘sottishly’ projected their own theories and experiments onto the works of the
ancient poets. Henry Reynolds urged in his Mythomystes (1632) that the hidden
meaning of the ancient myths – in contrast to modern poets – could not be obvious
moral lessons but that they should be read as covert statements of a secret natural
78 Vermeir, op. cit. (2).
79 For Ashmole see Wiliam Newman and Anthony Grafton (eds.), Secrets of Nature, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2001, p. 21. For Bacon see Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon (ed. J. von Spedding, R.J. Ellis,
D.D. Heath), 14 vols., Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1857–1874, vol. 3, p. 289.
80 Natale Conti, Natalis Comitis Mythologiae, Venice, 1581, p. 1, ‘omnia philosophiae dogmata non
apertè, sed obscurè sub quibusdam integumentis traderentur’.
81 Rhodri Lewis, ‘Francis Bacon, allegory and the uses of myth’, Review of English Studies (2010) 61, pp.
360–389.
82 Bacon, op. cit. (79), vol. 4, pp. 316–317; for the Latin variant see idem, op. cit. (79), vol. 1, p. 520.
83 Bacon, op. cit. (79).
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philosophy.84 Kircher also believed in the prisca sapientia and thought that the Egyptian
myths and hieroglyphs contained traces of an original divine knowledge.85 In contrast,
the Royal Society would take a clear stance against allegorical expressions, as is clear
from Thomas Sprat’s remarks on scientiﬁc discourse in the History of the Royal Society
(1667). Sprat also dismissed allegorical interpretations: ‘The Wit of the Fables and
Religions of the Ancient World is well-nigh consum’d: They have already serv’d the
Poets long enough; and it is now high time to dismiss them; especially seing . . . that there
were only ﬁctions at ﬁrst.’86 Boyle and many other naturalists argued even against the
use of mathematics and mathematical symbolism in natural philosophy because of its
esoteric and elitist character.87 By 1689, Philip Ayres only gave moral explications of
Aesop’s fables in hisMythologia Ethica. Nevertheless, in a lecture for the Royal Society,
Robert Hooke still ventured to give a physical interpretation of Ovid’s myth. Hooke did
not believe that Ovid was divinely enlightened or transmitted some prelapsarian ancient
wisdom, but he thought it plausible that the poet would codify geological hypotheses or
a prehistorical memory in his fables.88
In the early modern period, nature herself hid her secrets, and some natural
philosophers played along. While naturalists tried to hunt these secrets out, or even
tried to get to them by torture, Nature often made fun of them, confounding the inquirer,
giving hints and allusions, showing and hiding God’s footprints in the world. As Bacon
wrote,
Whereas of the sciences which regard nature, the divine philosopher declares that, ‘it is the
glory of God to conceal a thing, but it is the glory of the King [or natural philosopher] to ﬁnd a
thing out.’ Even as though the divine nature took pleasure in the innocent and kindly sport of
children playing at hide and seek.89
Medieval secrets had become allusive jokes. In The serious jokes of nature and art, by
Kircher’s pupil, Gaspar Schott, we can see that the world was full of allusions, intelligible
only for those who shared the joke.90 In his Sigalion, or Mythical Wisdom, appended to
works on allegoric exegesis and emblematics, the Jesuit Juan Eusebio Nieremberg wrote
a long allegory about the God of Secrecy, who had to select true wisdom among gods
and quarrelling philosophical sects. Sigalion (or Harpocrates) awarded the nymph Echo,
because the truly wise keep silent unless asked to speak, and if they speak, they just
return what has been said.91
84 Henri Reynolds,Mythomystes, London, 1632, passim, for example p. 62.
85 Newton, for his part, believed that the Mosaic tradition was transmitted to the Egyptians, but they
corrupted it by mixing it with polytheism, the Kabbala and gnosticism.
86 Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society, London, 1667, p. 414.
87 See references in note 55 above.
88 Philip Ayres, Mythologia Ethica, London, 1689; Robert Hooke, The Posthumous Works of Robert
Hooke, London, 1705, pp. 377, 426.
89 Bacon, op. cit. (79), vol. 4, p. 20
90 Paula Findlen, ‘Jokes of Nature and jokes of knowledge’, Renaissance Quarterly (1990) 43, pp. 292–
331.
91 Juan Eusebio Nieremberg, Sigalion sive de sapientia mythica in Stromata Sacrae Scripturae, Lyon, 1642,
pp. 457–549. For the passage on Echo see p. 539.
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Harpocrates raises his ﬁnger to his lips. The root of the English word ‘mystery’ and the
Latin word mysterium is a Greek verb, muein, which means to close the mouth. This
indicates the silence and secrecy that is often related to ancient mysteries; it refers to that
which cannot be talked about. Sometimes, if you try to formulate the ‘mystery’, or to
make it explicit, it disappears, like a poem that cannot bear explicit analysis of its
evocative power. Something similar is true for early modern natural philosophy and
magic, intertwined with religious and esoteric traditions. What is forgotten in a simple
analysis of openness and secrecy is that communication cannot be reduced to discrete
bits of ‘information’. Complex political, moral or religious meanings were attached to
almost every object and text. Like tacit knowledge, the complex modes of veiling and
unveiling in early modern natural philosophy, spiritual alchemy, natural magic and
religion constituted meanings that could not otherwise be expressed. Metaphors,
emblems and hieroglyphs showed in an allusive, indirect way, and permeated the whole
of early modern culture.92 For the church fathers, the theatre was the epitome of
falseness, but this traditional attitude was reversed by the Jesuits, for whom the theatre
became a place where truth was shown. In Kircher’s oeuvre, theatricality, illusions and
allusions merged, and pointed to something beyond.
Again, it is important to stress the social aspects of these subtle forms of veiling
and unveiling. Especially in seventeenth-century courtier culture, knowledge and
control of these dissimulations and symbolic representations was vital. Shared
allegorical secrets and ways of interpretation, reserved for elites only, constituted
tight social groups and were a way of expressing political, religious and philosophical
values. Policing the boundaries of these groups, the ﬂow of information, meaning and
trust constituted power. A study of the distribution of secrecy tells us a lot about where
and how power is active. Studies guided by crude concepts of secrecy are only able to
reﬂect the most blatant presences of authoritative power. A more subtle account of
openness and secrecy will help to uncover the ﬁne structures of more diffuse kinds of
power.93
It is especially in situations where openness and secrecy are brought together, where
secrecy is veiled in openness, and vice versa, that power might be at its most subversive.
Kircher sometimes used this power for his own purposes, but his theatre plays as well as
his mathematical and philosophical works were also a subtle means to disseminate Jesuit
power. Their public nature, popularity and wide audience were combined with a control
of information and a play of veiling and unveiling in support of cultural, political and
religious values. As with tacit and embodied knowledge, the effect of embodying
religious doctrine by means of implicit associations and allusions is so much the
stronger. It was a much subtler way of exercising power as compared to brute censorship
or suppression.
92 For the relation between emblems, symbolism and various forms of secrecy see e.g. Claude François
Ménestrier’s work on a ‘philosophy of images’ (especially his La Philosophie des images enigmatiques, Lyon,
1694) and Silvester Pietrasancta, De Symbolis Heroicis Libri IX., Antwerpen: Plantijn-Moretus, 1634 (esp.
book 4: ‘De Notis Clandestinis’).
93 See Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986,
vol. 1, p. 8, for ‘diffuse power’.
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Coda
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, I have argued that ‘openness’ and ‘secrecy’ should be
understood as positive categories that do not necessarily stand in opposition to each
other. This allows us to see certain historical practices in a different light. In the second
part of this paper, I have called for a historicization of the concepts of ‘openness’ and
‘secrecy’. Actors’ categories and emblematic forms reveal a rich taxonomy related to
openness and secrecy. From the medieval occulta cordis, divided into mysterium (that
which only God can know), secretum (that which is nobody else’s business) and
inhonestum (that which has to be hidden discretely for social reasons),94 to Immanuel
Kant’s distinction between arcana (the secrets of nature), secreta (the secrets of state) and
mystera (the secrets of religion),95 secrecy was conceptualized and taxonomized in
different ways. The concrete and context-speciﬁc interactions between these terms and
the practices they imply should be studied. We need distinctions between the kinds of
secrecy and openness that prevailed in certain periods and contexts. Such a study will
show that openness and secrecy can have many faces.
In this paper, I have concentrated on esoteric traditions, on the theatrical aspects of
secrecy and on secretive allegory that was a central part of early modern culture. These
practices are also test cases, because they cannot be analysed with oppositional
categories of ‘openness’ and ‘secrecy’. What do you want to say when you make explicit
that you have a secret? It is a signpost, already the ﬁrst step to its unveiling. It is also a
successful technique for attracting and captivating your spectators or readers. This might
be one of the meanings of Kircher’s Harpocrates. On the one hand, the image of a god
admonishing silence, openly showing that there is secrecy involved, is the best way to
spur your readers on, to fascinate them. Alluding to secrecy might be the best way to
disseminate your ideas. On the other hand, Harpocrates refers to a mystery, unspoken
and unspeakable. Harpocrates’ serious joke, the paradoxical conjoining of two seeming
opposites, openness and secrecy, makes meaning perpetually evasive. But in that
paradox, a deeper truth is revealed, which can illuminate Kircher’s oeuvre as well as the
historiography of openness and secrecy.
94 Peter von Moos, ‘“Herzensgeheimnisse” (occulta cordis). Selbstbewahrung und Selbstentblößung im
Mittelalter’, in Assmann and Assmann, op. cit. (4), vol. 1, p. 89–110.
95 Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, vol. 6, Berlin:
Akademieausgabe, 1907, pp. 137–138.
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